

Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W

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O 151212Z OCT 75

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5568

AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY

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CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 01 OF 03 LONDON 15811

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XEDS-1

TAGS: PFOR, GP, UK

SUBJECT: CARAMANLIS VISIT TO LONDON

REF: ATHENS 7812

SUMMARY. BRITISH BELIEVE CARAMANLIS VISIT WENT REMARKABLY WELL. THEY WERE ABLE TO ASSURE GREEKS THAT U.S. HAD NO WISH TO PUSH GREEKS INTO RASH DECISION CONCERNING ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH NATO. IN THIS CONNECTION, CARAMANLIS TOLD WILSON HE WAS LOOKING FOR OCCASION TO RETURN TO FULL NATO MEMBERSHIP, AFTER CYPRUS ISSUE WAS RESOLVED. CARAMANLIS ASKED THAT UK USE ITS INFLUENCE IN ANKARA TO CONVINCE TURKS TO MOVE ON CYPRUS PROBLEM, AND SAID MOTIVE BEHIND GREECE'S APPLICATION FOR EC ENTRY WAS POLITICAL RATHER THAN ECONOMIC. END SUMMARY.

1. GENERAL ATMOSPHERE. MICHAEL WESTON, ASSISTANT DEPT. HEAD IN FAO FOR SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE, BRIEFED USOCT. 14 ON GREEK PRIME MINISTER CARAMANLIS' OCTOBER 9 - 11 OFFICIAL VISIT TO THE UK. BRITISH BELIEVE THAT VISIT AS A WHOLE WENT PECULIARLY WELL AND MUCH BETTER THAN THEY DARED HOPE. BY WAY OF BACKGROUND, WESTON SAID THAT CARAMANLIS HAD VIRTUALLY INVITED HIMSELF TO BRITAIN. HE

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HAD FIRST SPREAD THE WORD AROUND WESTERN EUROPE THAT HE

WANTED TO VISIT LONDON AND, AT ONE POINT EVEN INDICATED HE HAD BEEN ASKED TO COME BEFORE BRITISH HAD EXTENDED INVITATION. THEREFORE, THERE WAS NO PARTICULAR ENTHUSIASM IN HMG FOR THE VISIT. MOREOVER, CARAMANLIS' AIDES HAD BEEN DIFFICULT CONCERNING PROTOCOL NICETIES IN PERIOD IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE PRIME MINISTER'S ARRIVAL. THEY COMPLAINED THAT HE WAS NOT BEING MET BY THE PRIME MINISTER OR THE SECRETARY OF STATE; THAT HE WAS NOT BEING RECEIVED BY THE QUEEN; AND THAT PRIME MINISTER WILSON WAS SLOW IN AGREEING TO ATTEND CARAMANLIS' RETURN HOSPITALITY. BUT, DESPITE THIS RATHER FOREBODING BACKDROP, PAINTED EVEN DARKER BY THE COOLNESS IN UK-GREEK RELATIONS SINCE THE CYPRUS CRISIS LAST YEAR, AND THROUGH WHAT WESTON DESCRIBED AS A SERIES OF ACCIDENTS, THE BRITISH BELIEVE CARAMANLIS WAS "THRILLED TO BITS" WITH THE WAY THINGS WENT.

2. THE PRINCIPAL FORTITUDE WAS A RESULT OF CARAMANLIS' SENSITIVITY OVER RECENT SIGNALS FROM THE U.S., INCLUDING PRESENTATION AT NATO, RELATING TO GREECE'S RELATIONSHIP WITH ALLIANCE WHICH HE PERCEIVED AS AN AMERICAN ATTEMPT TO PUSH HIM INTO A CORNER. ALMOST IMMEDIATELY UPON ARRIVAL, HE EXPRESSED, THROUGH FOREIGN MINISTER BITSIOS, CONCERN OVER THIS MATTER TO THE BRITISH AND ASKED THAT THEY DO WHATEVER THEY COULD TO CONVINCE THE U.S. TO ABANDON WHAT HE REGARDED AS CRUDE PRESSURE TACTICS. IT WAS AT THIS POINT THAT FOREIGN SECRETARY CALLAGHAN CALLED SECRETARY KISSINGER AND, ACCORDING TO BRITISH, WAS ASSURED THAT THE U.S. HAD NO WISH TO FORCE THE GREEKS INTO A RASH DECISION REGARDING ITS CONNECTION WITH NATO. WESTON SAID CARAMANLIS IMMEDIATELY ACCEPTED THIS ASSURANCE AT FACE VALUE AND WAS VISIBLY RELIEVED. THE BRITISH WERE THUS, AT THE OUTSET, ABLE TO DO SOMETHING

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SPECIFIC AND USEFUL FOR CARAMANLIS WHICH THEY BELIEVE
SET A POSITIVE TONE FOR THE REST OF THE VISIT.

3. CYPRUS. THE TWO PRIME MINISTERS TALKED FOR 3 HOURS-
AN UNUSUALLY LONG TIME BY WILSON'S STANDARDS - ON
OCTOBER 9. THEY MET FIRST FOR 20 MINUTES ALONE WITH
ONLY AN INTERPRETER, THEN WERE JOINED BY THE FOREIGN
MINISTERS FOR THE BALANCE OF THE EXCHANGE. CARAMANLIS
BEGAN WITH AN EXTENSIVE EXPOSITION ON CYPRUS. HIS
PRESENTATION WAS ALONG PREDICTABLE LINES, WITH THE
EMPHASIS ON THE LAST 18 MONTHS. HE CONCLUDED BY ASSERT-
ING THAT THE GREEK ARMY AND THE GREEK PEOPLE WERE GROW-
ING TIRED OF THE PRESENT SITUATION AND ONCE THE TURKISH
PRETEXTS OF THE AMERICAN ARMS EMBARGO AND THE TURKISH
SENATE ELECTIONS WERE OUT OF THE WAY, HE HOPED THAT ALL
COUNTRIES WITH INFLUENCE IN ANKARA WOULD USE IT. THE
BRITISH AFFIRMED THEY WOULD USE SUCH INFLUENCE AS THEY
HAD IN ANKARA IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE ELECTIONS, AND
OTHERS, INCLUDING THE NINE, WOULD BE DOING THE SAME.(IN
THIS CONNECTION, WE UNDERSTAND THAT CALLAGHAN SENT
MESSAGE OCTOBER 13 TO TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTER IN WHICH
HE ARGUED IT WAS TIME TO PROCEED TOWARD A CYPRUS SETTLE-
MENT AND URGED GOT TO ALLOW DENKTASH TO MAKE TERRITORIAL
PROPOSALS.) CARAMANLIS THEN SUGGESTED THAT IF THESE
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EFFORTS FAILED, CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO OSTRACIZING TURKEY FROM THE COMMUNITY OF EUROPEAN NATIONS.
THE BRITISH DID NOT RESPOND TO THAT NEEDLE AND
CARAMANLIS DID NOT FORCE IT. IN AN ASIDE, WESTON TOLD
US THAT ONE OF THE PROBLEMS WITH CONCERTED EC ACTION
REGARDING CYPRUS WAS THAT THE FRENCH BRIEFED THE GREEKS
IN DETAIL ON A COMMUNITY DISCUSSIONS AND THUS NONE OF THE
REST OF THE NINE, KNOWING THEIR COMMENTS WOULD BE RE-
PLAYED IN ATHENS, SPOKE VERY FRANKLY.

4. THE TALK LEXT TURNED TO MAKARIOS' POSITION.
CARAMANLIS CLAIMED THERE COULD BE NO SOLUTION OF THE
CYPRUS PROBLEM WITHOUT MAKARIOS. CLERIDES WAS ALL RIGHT

IN HIS WAY, BUT HE HAD NO INDEPENDENT POWER BASE. CARAMANLIS SAID HE POSESSED A CERTAIN ABILITY TO INFLUENCE MAKARIOS AND HE WOULD BE PREPARED TO DO JUST THAT ONCE TURKEY PRODUCED REASONABLE PROPOSALS. WHEN WILSON ASKED WHAT CARAMANLIS WOULD CONSIDER REASONABLE PROPOSALS, HE WAS TOLD THAT IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR ANY GREEK GOVERNMENT TO ACCEPT TURKISH CONTROL OVER MORE THAN 25 PERCENT OF THE TERRITORY OF CYPRUS, AND THE TURKS NOW OCCUPY OVER 40 PERCENT OF THE LAND. IN ENDING THE CONVERSATION CONCERNING CYPRUS, CARAMANLIS SAID THE TURKS BELIEVED MAKARIOS WAS TRYING TO PREVENT ANY CYPRUS SETTLEMENT. CALLAGHAN INDICATED HE DID NOT AGREE AND THAT MAKARIOS HAD BECOME A "WISER MAN AS HE HAD GROWN OLDER".

5. GREECE-EC, CARAMANLIS SAID THAT THE MOTIVE BEHIND GREECE'S APPLICATION FOR EC ENTRY WAS POLITICAL RATHER THAN ECONOMIC. HE BELIEVED THAT GREEK MEMBERSHIP IN THE EC WOULD CONSOLIDATE DEMOCRACY IN GREECE. TRAGIC EVENTS OF LAST SEVEN YEARS WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE IF GREECE HAD BEEN MEMBER OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY. CAUTIONING CARAMANLIQ THAT FULL GREEK MEMBERSHIP IN EC WOULD BE A SLOW SLOG, AND REMINDING HIM HOW LONG IT HAD TAKEN THE BRITISH TO GET IN, WILSON OBSERVED THERE WERE SOME AMONG THE NINE WHO THOUGHT THAT THE ENTRANCE OF GREECE, TURKEY, SPAIN AND PORTUGAL INTO THE COMMUNITY WOULD

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CAUSE SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL PROBLEMS. CARAMANLIS
REACTION SHARPLY AND SAID GREECE SHOULD NOT BE LUMPED
WITH THE OTHER THREE. UNLIKE THEM, GREEKS HAD AGREEMENT
OF ASSOCIATION WHICH SPECIFICALLY LOOKED FORWARD
TO FULL EC MEMBERSHIP. WILSON THEN OPINED THAT THE
MAIN PROBLEM OF GREEK ENTRY WOULD BE WITH THOSE
COUNTRIES WHICH PRODUCE WINE AND OLIVES WITH WHICH
GREEK EXPORTS WOULD COMPETE. CARAMANLIS ALLEGED THAT HE
HAD NO WORRIES IN THAT BOTH THE FRENCH AND ITALIAN
GOVERNMENTS HAD ASSURED HIM "AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL" THAT
THERE WOULD BE NO PROBLEMS ON THOSE GROUNDS.

6. GREECE-NATO. CARAMANLIS EXPLAINED THAT HE HAD BEEN
FACED WITH TWO ALTERNATIVES IN THE PERIOD IMMEDIATELY
FOLLOWING THE SECOND TURKISH INVASION OF CYPRUS: (1)
DECLARE WAR; (2) OR WITHDRAW FROM NATO. PULLING OUT
FROM THE MILITARY SIDE OF THE ALLIANCE WAS THE ABSOLUTE
MINIMUM HE COULD DO AT THAT TIME. IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE
FOR GREECE TO RETURN TO THE NATO INTEGRATED
MILITARY STRUCTURE UNTIL THE CYPRUS PROBLEM WAS SETTLED.
HOWEVER, HE WANTED THE UK TO KNOW HE WAS LOOKING FOR
OCCASION TO RETURN TO FULL NATO MEMBERSHIP. CARAMANLIS
APPEALED TO WILSON -- AND BY EXTENSION TO ALLIANCE --
NOT TO FORCE HIS HAND. IF COMPELLED TO CHOOSE NOW
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BETWEEN FULL ALLIANCE MEMBERSHIP OR LEAVING NATO, GOG
WOULD HAVE NO ALTERNATIVE EXCEPT TO LEAVE. FACT THAT

FROM COMMUNIQUE TO AVOID GIVING IMPRESSION THAT GREEKS
WERE BEING COERCED BY WILSON TO COME ALL THE WAY BACK
INTO THE NATO NEST. CONVERSATION BETWEEN PRIME
MINISTERS ENDED WITH BRIEF AND PROSAIC EXCHANGE ABOUT
YUGOSLAVIA AFTER TITO AND CURRENT STATE OF EAST/WEST
RELATIONS WHICH TURNED UP NO NUGGETS.

RICHARDSON

NOTE BY OC/T: SECTION 3 OF 3 LONDON 15811; #APPARENT OMISSION.
CORRECTION/CLARIFICATION TO FOLLOW.

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